Economic Justice

Assignment:
Critically examine and evaluate Rawls’s or Nozick’s theory of social justice.*  Your examination must include the following:

(a)  Clearly outline the essential principles and elements of the theory you choose to cover.

(b)  Evaluate the theory with respects to its strengths and weaknesses.

(c)  State whether you think that the theory is a reasonable basis upon which a just society should be organized.  Justify your position with cogent arguments.
 
(*)  In this essay you are required to focus on only ONE  of the two theories.  Of course, if you so choose, you may address, compare, or contrast the two theories.  However, make sure you answer all the essay questions fully and thoroughly regarding at least one theory.

Instructions:
Short writing assignments must be no less than two hundred (200) of your own words. This means that quotations do not count against the two hundred words. I will not even read assignments shorter than the required minimum of 200 words (I use a program to monitor word-count) and you will automatically receive zero (0) points for any such assignments. I expect a professionally written essay that is well formulated, without spelling and grammatical errors. I will deduct points for sloppily written essays (see the rubric below). In your essay you should address the question posed directly and thoroughly. You do not need to waste too much space on background unless the question of the essay specifically demands such background.

Notes from instructor:
Rawls (2007) and Nozick (2007).
Note: Remember that you must also read the articles assigned each week. Instructor’s notes are not a substitute for reading the original articles. 
A. Preliminaries.
Economic justice is one of the most, if not the most, difficult and important social problem humanity faced during the 20thCentury and I venture to say that it will face throughout the 21stCentury. Below I will state two of the most important social problems humanity has faced and then offer a brief historicaloutline of the problems and why are we still facing the problem of economic justice. 
1. As far back as human beings were able to reflect upon their own society, humanity encountered two intimately related, yet separate, problems about the best way to organize their social identity:
(I) The Problem of Political-Organization: What justifies the political authority of one agent ruling over any other agent? 
​and
(II) The Problem of Economic-Organization (or Economic Justice): What is a just and fair distribution of material goods (i.e., resources, wealth, and property)? 
2. In order to understand the nature of these two problems and appreciate their complexity, it is imperative to distinguish between an explanatory versus a normative or justificatoryapproach from which each can be examined. The explanatoryapproach aims to give a causal account that explains facts about the manner in which a given society is organized on a variety of different dimensions (e.g., political, economic, cultural, etc.,). The normative or justificatory approach, by contrast, inquires about whether those very same facts are justified and if so in what way. 
3. Consider, for instance, the problem of Political-Organization (problem (I) above). Throughout much of human history, the most common form of Political-Organization has been one form or another of Monarchy. Now, one might explain the fact that monarchs obtained and maintained their political power by appeal to force. However, such an explanation, even if true, does not address the question of what justifies the authority of the monarch to rule, since the later question is a normative one, not a descriptive one. 
4. During the 16th and 17th Centuries the question of the justification of the authority of monarchs to rule was explicitly asked by several thinkers such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, (the so-called Social-Contract theorists), and others. The prevailing (and only) normative answer to this question appealed to divine authority. Without going into too much historical detail, several authors (particularly Locke) demonstrated the inadequacy of this form of justification for the authority of monarchs to rule. 
5. However, challenging the divine authority of monarchs to rule is one thing; offering an alternative normative account that justifies the authority to rule of one agent over another is an altogether different matter. The Social-Contract-Theory offered an answer to the later question: the only justification for the authority of one person to rule over another derives from a contractual agreement based upon the autonomous consent of the parties involved.
5. The Social-Contract-Theory offered what appeared to be a viable solution to the Political-Organization Problem. Free and autonomous persons consent to a contractual agreement to transfer some of their natural rights to an authority in exchange for certain services that such an authority provides. 
6. While the Social-Contract-Theory addressed the problem of political organization and offered a viable solution, it altogether ignored the second problem noted above; i.e., the problem of Economic-Organization. I suspect that social contract theorists thought that once an adequate normative account is given to the political organization problem, the economic organization problem will take care of itself. This hypothesis seemed to make sense, since those who controlled political power generally also controlled economic wealth. As it turns out, the hypothesis was wrong. Even if one thinks that social-contract theory adequately solves the political organization problem, the 19th and 20thCenturies have clearly demonstrated that the economic organization problem still persists. Hence, one of the most important social problem humanity faces during the 21st century is the problem of economic organization.
7. It is extremely important to understand that the problem of economic organization is predicated on the assumption that material goods are scarce. 
8. A second important point to remember is this: once the normative question is raised about the nature and character of a just and/or fair economic organization )problem (II) above), many assumptions taken for granted by the social contract theorists may be challenged, including the question of the justification of private property ownership. 
9. I hope the above offers you a reasonable historical and conceptual background to the problem of economic justice and to Rawls’ and Nozick’s approaches to solving it.
[Below you will find notes for each of the authors courtesy of Dr. Mark Vuletic. I found his notes very clear and helpful so I offer them to you intact.]
B. Rawls (2007)
1. Rawls’ theory of justice
Article #52 was extracted from John Rawls’ book, A Theory of Justice, which is generally
considered the most influential book on political philosophy published in the last century.
Since we are dealing only with an excerpt, the account you will get of Rawls will be
very much simplified; however, even the simplification is complicated enough, and will
provide ample substance for reflection.
Rawls wants to develop and defend the idea of JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, according to
which “the principles of justice for the basic structure of society [are] the principles that
free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an
initial position of equality” (Rawls 2007, p. 565). This idea often is understood as a variation
on a class of ethical theories known as contractarian theories, according to which
moral obligations arise from mutual agreement among rational individuals to be bound
by those obligations. However, Rawls’ theory is different in two main ways: (i) it deals
only with the nature of justice, rather than, more broadly, with the nature of the right—
considerations of justice may be relevant in determining which actions are right, but they
are not the only relevant considerations; (ii) its goal is to give us only broad principles
for “the basic structure of society,” not principles to govern all of our individual actions.
Rawls’ theory, in short, is a political theory rather than a comprehensive ethical one.
2 The original position and the veil of ignorance
Two of the key ideas Rawls introduces are the idea of the ORIGINAL POSITION and the
VEIL OF IGNORANCE. The original position is the “initial position of equality” Rawls
refers to above, and the veil of ignorance is a device that helps us to figure out what the
original position would be like.
The veil of ignorance is exactly what it sounds like—veils hide certain things from
observers, producing ignorance in the observers about what is hidden. If I place a veil
over my window, and you are walking down the street, you will not be able to see what
is inside my home, and so will be ignorant of its contents.1 In the case of Rawls’ veil of
ignorance, the veil in question hides from us virtually all of the things we know about
ourselves as individuals. For instance, when you imagine yourself behind the veil of
ignorance, you have to imagine yourself losing all knowledge about your social status,
your nationality, your economic class, the color of your skin, your personal talents, and
even your own conception of the good (this last point is very important, and we will
come back to it in a bit). The veil of ignorance also hides from us virtually everything we
know about the world, so you would also not know, for instance, how people and natural
resources are distributed geographically. You lose all of this when you step behind the
veil of ignorance.
Now, there are a few things you still can know about yourself and the world when
you are in the original position. The article does not go into this, so I will quote from the
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy here to give you a sample:
The parties [behind the veil of ignorance] are not however completely ignorant
of facts. They know all kinds of general facts about persons and societies, including
knowledge of the relatively uncontroversial laws and generalizations
derivable from economics, psychology, political science, and biology and other
natural sciences. They know then about the general tendencies of human behavior
and psychological development, about biological evolution, and about
how economic markets work, including neoclassical price theory of supply
and demand. As discussed below, they also know about the circumstances of
justice—moderate scarcity and limited altruism—as well as the desirability of
the “primary social goods” that are needed to live a good life and to develop
their “moral powers.”
So, these general items of knowledge, plus ignorance of one’s particular circumstances,
are components of the original position. The last significant component of the original position
is the presumption that agents in the original position are self-interested—they seek
to maximize their own benefit as much as possible. Thus, to sum up once more, if you
imagine yourself in the original position, you are imagining yourself being self-interested,
but lacking all knowledge—especially knowledge about yourself—except knowledge of
the very broad facts listed above.
Now, suppose you were in the original position, and you had to decide upon “the principles
of justice for the basic structure of society.” Which principles would you choose?
Rawls believes that the principles a rational person would come up with under these
circumstances are the true principles of justice.
Mind you, now, Rawls is not suggesting that anyone is, or ever has been, in the original
position (one would have to have a terrible case of amnesia to actually be behind the veil of
ignorance, and amnesiacs, of course, do not have the power to dictate the basic structure
of society). The original position is just a hypothetical device that is supposed to lead you
to the right answer.
So, what principles would a rational person choose under these circumstances?
3 Rawls’ principles of justice
One principle Rawls thinks a rational person in the original position would not choose
is the principle of utility, by which Rawls designates the principle that says that society
ought to be ordered so as to maximize total individual well-being. Why? Because it is
quite possible that the principles which maximize total individual well-being result in
some individuals losing out completely. But, if you had no idea who you are, then how
could you possibly know you would not turn out to be one of the individuals who loses
out when the veil of ignorance lifts? Rawls thinks a rational, self-interested person would
not want to run that risk, and hence would reject the principle of utility as a principle for
the basic structure of society.
The two principles Rawls thinks people in the original position would choose are:
First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty
compatible with a similar liberty for others.
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are
both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached
to positions and offices open to all. (571)
The first principle is commonly referred to as the LIBERTY PRINCIPLE. It is conventional
to divide the second principle into two distinct ones based upon two clauses, clause
(a) being called the DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE, and clause (b) being called the PRINCIPLE OF
FAIR EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY
The “basic liberties” referred to by the liberty principle are (roughly), the right to vote,
eligibility for public office, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, liberty of conscience
/ freedom of thought, freedom to hold personal property, and freedom from arbitrary
search and seizure.
The principles are ordered, so that violations of the liberty principle are not permitted
even for the sake of greater social or economic advantages for all. Also, they are not
absolute, but the best and widest approximation we have to justice. Where they fail, we
fall back upon the more general principle that unequal distributions of anything can only
be justified if the distribution is to everyone’s advantage.
One may ask, why would Rawls think that someone in the original position would
care about all of the basic liberties listed? And why rate them so important that one
would not be willing to sacrifice some of them for greater social or economic advantages
for everyone? Remember that, according to Rawls, one doesn’t even know what one’s own
conception of the good is, when behind the veil of ignorance. That is, if you envision yourself
in the original position, you have to envision yourself not knowing what kind of life you
want to live. Given this, Rawls points out that the safest bet for you is to accept living in
a society in which you are guaranteed the basic liberties in his list. If, when the veil of
ignorance is removed, it turns out that you do not want to exercise one of those rights,
you will not have to—but having all of those rights guaranteed to you is the only way,
behind the veil of ignorance, that you can be sure you will have the choice to not exercise
one of those rights. That is, even if you realize that you might turn out to be an opponent
of liberal society, you still will want a guarantee that your views will not be quashed,
which in turn requires you to have the basic liberties above. Thus, says Rawls, no one in
the original position can rationally want to trade his or her basic liberties for anything.
However, as you may have noticed, Rawls takes agents in the original position to be
risk-averse. The two principles he thinks agents will settle on express the MAXIMIN RULE,
according to which the best of a set of alternatives is the alternative with the least bad
worst-case outcome. According to Rawls, the maximin rule is a rational strategy under
certain conditions, all of which he believes are satisfied when one stands behind the veil
of ignorance:
1. The probabilities of the various outcomes are unknown (trivially satisfied by the
original position).
2. The person choosing doesn’t care much whether an outcome goes beyond merely
good enough (Rawls needs this so people will not gamble with minimum social
advantages for a chance at greater social advantages—to him, rational people will
be satisfied when they pass a certain standard of well-being)
3. The situation involves grave risks (also satisfied by the original position—if you
choose the wrong principles, you may stand to lose everything when the veil of
ignorance lifts).
If Rawls is mistaken about the veil of ignorance requiring a rational person to follow
the maximin rule, then he may be mistaken about the principles of justice a rational
person would choose.
C. Nozick (2007)
4 Nozick’s theory of justice
Robert Nozick’s understanding of justice is nearly as far removed from Rawls’ as can be.
According to Nozick, “a distribution is just if everyone is entitled to the holdings they
possess under the distribution” (579). A person is entitled to a holding if (and only if) the
holding has been:
1. acquired in accordance with the principle of JUSTICE IN ACQUISITION, or
2. acquired in accordance with the principle of JUSTICE IN TRANSFER, from someone
who is entitled to the holding.
One of the unfortunate (and, frankly, bizarre) aspects of Nozick’s work is that it never
explicitly defines the two alleged “principles” above. Hence, I will simply drop the word
principle, and simply refer to justice in acquisition and justice in transfer as properties that
acquisition of holdings can have or lack.
5 A process view of justice
Nozick’s view of justice is a process view: whether or not a distribution is just is determined
by how a distribution came into being, rather than by the form a distribution has. According
to Nozick, any distribution, no matter what it looks like, is just, as long as the
individual holdings in the distribution were acquired in a manner that satisfies the criteria
for justice in acquisition or justice in transfer.
6 What are the criteria for justice in acquisition?
Nozick does not explain what the criteria of justice in acquisition are in your reading, so I
will summarize some of his discussion elsewhere to fill in this gap. First, let’s understand
that when Nozick talks about acquisition in this context, he means acquisition through a
means other than transfer: he is talking about the original process by which holdings are
generated in the first place. JOHN LOCKE (1632-1704) originally argued that we generate
property (holdings) by “mixing our labor” with raw materials; Nozick proceeds in a similar
vein. For instance, according to the two, if you came across a patch of unclaimed land,
you wouldn’t simply be able to stipulate that it is yours; however, if you started to work
the land—say, by tilling the soil—then the land would become your property because you
have mixed your labor into it. Likewise, you can’t just mark off a copse of trees as your
own (unless you have planted them), but if you do the work of cutting them down, the
lumber becomes your property.
Justice in acquisition does not necessarily involve mixing labor with raw natural resources;
it can involve converting justly transferred holdings into a new kind of holding.
For instance, to justly acquire shoes, you do not need to procure leather by hunting and
tanning; you can simply purchase the leather from someone else (a just transfer of raw
materials), and convert them into shoes. The shoes themselves are new holdings, and you
have acquired them justly because they derive from the mixing of your labor with other
materials which you held justly.
There are limits on these processes (for instance, there are limits to what unclaimed
resources you can justly acquire through labor if the resource is sufficiently scarce), but
we won’t worry about them. I just wanted to give you a sense of how it is that one can
generate new holdings where there were no holdings before.
7 What are the criteria for justice in transfer?
Although Nozick does not explicitly say what justice in transfer is, we can infer his meaning
from the kinds of transfers he says are ruled out, such transfers based on theft or
fraud. It seems that to Nozick, a transfer is just if it is (i) voluntary, in the sense of uncoerced,
and (ii) informed, in the sense that both parties in the transfer know exactly what
is happening (so that neither is being defrauded). It does not necessarily have to be a wise
transfer, or a compassionate transfer, or a useful transfer, just a transfer that you freely opt
to make without having been actively deceived by someone.
8 The theory neither precludes nor requires any particular
pattern of distribution
Let me underscore one of the first things I said about Nozick: on his theory, we cannot
tell whether a distribution is just simply by looking at the pattern; any distribution can be
just, and any distribution can be unjust. Why? Let’s consider a few possible distributions:
           Person 1
      Person 2
       Person 3
Distribution A
              5
               5
            5
Distribution B
              7
             10
          14
Distribution C
              2
             50
          1000
How might each of these distributions come about in a just manner, according to Nozick?
Here’s one way: let’s suppose that everyone starts out with nothing whatsoever, so that
there is no question about the justice of the initial distribution. Each distribution could
represent the product of just acquisitions of goods by initial labor on raw materials encountered
in nature. Distributions A, B, and C would simply represent the results of the
three people exerting themselves to different degrees, or with varying degrees of success.
Here’s another way: let’s suppose that everyone acquires goods from nature at the
same rate. However, person 3 has (or develops) some special natural talent, like being
an outstanding story-teller. When persons 1 and 2 discover this, they start to voluntarily
trade their holdings to person 3 in exchange for entertaining stories. If the exchange rate is
not steady, it is possible for each of distributions A, B, and C to be realized over time. Since
the exchanges are voluntary and informed, and the initial acquisitions of holdings from
the land are stipulated to be just, each of the distributions is just, on Nozick’s account.
This kind of process really could give you any distribution at all.
Likewise, distributions A and B could count as unjust on Nozick’s view, despite being
egalitarian and maximin respectively, if they have come about through coerced redistributions
of holdings. We cannot tell whether A, B, or C is just or unjust, unless we know how
each came into being.
References
Nozick, R. (2007). The entitlement theory of justice, in H. LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice:
Third Edition, Blackwell, MA, Malden, MA, chapter 53, pp. 578–590.
Rawls, J. (2007). A theory of justice, in H. LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice: Third Edition,
Blackwell, MA, Malden, MA, chapter 52, pp. 565–577.